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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J_._-\_jiES SDRALES and 
VIRGIXI~-\. Z_._-\~IBOUKOS, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
S_._-1ji RONDOS, 
Defendant arnd Ap~pellant. 
Case No. 
80031 
BRIEF O·F DEFENDAN'T AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT 
'This is an action commenced by the p1aintiffs to en-
join the defendant from trespassing u·pon lands claim·ed 
by the pJaintiffs. Def~endant counterclaimed and asked 
to have the Court determine that the defendant had 
acquired a right by prescription to a 12-foot strip, ex-
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tending from West Temple on the West, thence East 165 
feet to defendant's property. The defendant prosecutes 
this app~al from the judgment of the lower court en-
joining defendan1t fr~m using the right-of-way and deny-
i;ng defendant's counterclaim. 
This action involves property in down-town Salt 
Lake City, located on the south side of Second :South 
and immediately to the east of West Temple 'Stre·et. The 
Plaza Hotel is located on the southeast corner of the 
intersection of Second South and West Temple, and east 
of this hotel are small shop·s, cafes, be·er ·parlors, restau-
rants, cleaning establishments, etc., extending east to 
def.endant's property. The property of :the defendant is 
located at 63-65 West Second South ·Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and has a frontage of 40 feet on ·Second 
South and ·extends southerly seven rods from the prop-
erty line of Second .S:outh Street. 
The west line of defendant's property is 125 feet 
east of the property line of West ·Temple 'Street. Adjoin-
ing the Plaza Hot~l on the south is a 12-foot right-of-way 
which extends east from it entrance on West Temp~e 
Street to defendant's property, and along the north side 
of which there are entrances to the various stores, shop's 
and buildings of the occupants of the buildings fronting 
on Second South. At a point 75 feet east from West 
T·emple the alleyway widens by 2~6. feet and affords ac-
cess to 'buildings fronting on West 'T·emple and Third 
South, as well as ~h-ose. fronting on Second South. 'This 
al~eyway has be~n and is used by various p-roperty 
owners and tradesmen in making deliVieries. 
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The building of the defendant· is. a two-story brick 
building erected in 1891. In 1893 a heating plant was 
erected on the pr·einises which consisted of a large chim-
ney approximate~y 40 feet high, being an iron stack 
fixed to a cement base, which cemet base .extends ap-
proximately eight or nine f.eet above the ground; there 
is an ·excavated pit "~th cement side wall approximately 
eight feet in de'Prth, containing the coal bin and furnace, 
·with boiler and stoker. The south cement wall of the 
furnace room is ap·proximately on the south prop·erty 
line of defendant's property. 
The evidence in this case showing the use by the 
defendant and app·ellant of this righlt-of-way is not con-
troverted in any manner whatsoeve~ by plaintiffs, and 
the only evidence introduced as to the use of the right-
of-way is that of defendant. This ·evidence consists of the 
testimony of two very elderly witnesses ca.Ued by defen-
dant, one Richard H. Latimer, a co-owner of one-eleventh 
interest, and who collected rents for the estate for some 
fifty years, and the. other Anton F. Got berg, a retired 
tailor, who had occupied the premises since 1890. The 
evidence of these witnesses is support·ed by Exhibits 
3, 4, 5 a~d 6, being pictures of the· right-of-way. These 
witness-es testifi,e·d that the right-of-way had been used 
for well over forty years by the occupants and tenants. 
of defendant's 'P'roperty in making deliveries. of coal, 
merchandis·e, materials required for the repair of tile 
building and generally as a means of access for pedes-
trian and vehicular traffic. 'This evidence: was not contro-
verted in any manner whatsoever by plaintiffs. There is 
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no dispute whatsoever on the facts of the use of the 
property and right-of-way by the predecessors in inter-
est of def·endant and their tenants and occupants. 
Mr. Latimer testified that his father had owned 
this property a.s original patentee, and possessed it until 
his death in 1881. Mr. Latimer made all collections of 
rent for the family, and started such collecting in 1888. 
The L~atimer family took over the building now located 
on the premises in 1891. 
The eoal bin described afor·esaid as a part of the 
heating plant had a ca:pacity of five tons ('Tr. 75). At 
page 76 of the transcript Mr. Latimer testified that 
from the time he took it over, and p-ractically all of the 
time, he furnished the heat for the building, and for this 
purpose he purchased the coa'l which was brought in by 
trucks and wagon though the alleyway claimed by de-
fendant. He described the alleyway and right-of-way 
used in bringing the coal in as the 12-foo:t right-of-way 
claimed by defendant, and extending from West Temple 
east to the heating plant. 
At page 76 of the transcript Mr. Latimer also testi-
fied that 1these ·deliveries of coal would he from one to 
three loads per month, and this fact is also confirmed 
by Mr. Gotberg. !The courg.e of this right-of-way was 
marked by the red line appearing on plaintiff's Exhibit 
A, which 'likewise a})pears at Page 82' of the trans'Cript 
in the tes.timony of Mr. L.a!timer. 
I 
At Pages 84-85 of the transcrip·t appears the testi-
mony of Mr. Latimer where he states that the materials 
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for repairing the roof and building were brought in over 
this same right-of-way and the alleyway for mixing 
mortar to be used in repairing the tbuilding, etc. 
In addition to the delivery of coal to the furnace 
coal bin, Mr. Gotberg, at P'ages 98-100 of the transcript, 
testified that deliveries of coal were also made to !the 
location of the tailor shop occupying the west half of 
the building for use in the heating and operation of the 
shop. Mr. Gotberg, at Page 102 of the transcript, fur-
ther testified that the alleyway was used in making de-
liveries of merchandise and groceries for a period of 
twenty-five years to the occupants of defendant's pro!p-
erty. l\lr. Gotberg confirmed the :testimony of Mr. Lati-
mer to the effect that deliveries were made by way of 
this alleyway; that he observed such deliveries. Mr. 
Latimer testified that the r~epairs to the building would 
occur in the replacement of a new roof at least every 
ten years, and other construction, such as the e:vection 
of a brick addition on the southwest corner of defen-
dant's property, which was accomplished by the use of 
this right-of-way. 
At Page 101 of the transcript, Mr. Go't:berg stat·ed 
that for a period of time the upper floors of the building 
were advertised as a roominghouse·, hut that most of the 
upper floors w·ere us~ed for illegal business; tha:t one of 
these "ladies" occupied the p~lace for 1twenty-five years, 
and that their groceries and merchandise were brought to 
them through the rear entrance and by way of this a1ley-
way. Mr. Got berg ide~tified one of these "ladies'' as 
''Babe,'' and recalls that the grocery man drove to :the 
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back of the shop and took the groceries up to her. At 
Page 105 of 1the . transcript Mr. Got berg r~ecalls vividly 
the traffic that ·came to the rear entrance of the property, 
because he saw the girls jumping the fenee at the rear 
without any clothes on, inasmuch as his ''eyes were 
not so bad then.'' 
At Page 107 of the transcript, Mr. Mulliner asked 
the witness Got berg on cross-examination: 
''Have you ever seen a coal truck actually 
come in there, back into the boiler plant~ 
A. . Oh, yes, I seen that quite often, because 
after they had the ·garage building right here, 
right there on that corner, they had such a hard 
time to get in with. coal, so they sometimes had 
to carry it and sometimes had to have an ex-
tremely long chute to shoot it down, if they could 
get the wagon close enough it was easy to get i1t 
into the hole because the hole is in the ceiling of 
it. The machine shop is. built on the top of the 
ground.'' ' 
The property claimed by plaintiffs did not at any 
time, from the issuance of patent until the conveyance 
to the plaintiffs subsequent to 1939, exist in any one 
p1erson. The right-of-way crossed at all times property 
the title to which was in various individuals. In other 
words, the right-of-way never arose by reason of reten-
tion by any one owner for his own purpose. The evidence 
shows that Second :s:outh from defendant's -corner wes.t 
to West ;Temple and east to the Kearns Garage alley is 
lined solid wi~h . buildings, and the only acess to the 
property of defendant, and p.articular~y for the making 
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of' deliveries of coal, etc., had been for many years over 
the course of this right-of-way, as claimed and described 
by defendant ~s "itnesses, and as appeared in the pie-
tures. Any person, upon viewing ·this property, could 
readily see the n1aner in which the delivery. of coal and 
other supplies would be made to defendant's proi)erty 
by follo,ving this right-of-way as claimed hy defendant. 
In connection with plaintiff's motion to strike from 
the Bill of Particulars a~l of the material app·earing at 
Pages 140 to and including 145 of the transcript, defen-
dant desires to set forth the following facts: 
Defendant's cousel having presented a s1tipulation 
and order for the settlement of the Bill of Exceptions 
in this case in accordance with the transcribed record 
of the reporter, being Pages 1 to 139 of the transcript, 
and plaintiffs' counsel having refused :to sign the: stip-
ulation, counsel for p~laintiffs and defendant appear·ed 
before Judge Van Cott on December 18, 1948, for the 
purpose of having the Bi1ll of Exception settled. No writ-
ten objections had been filed by plaintiffs to the proposed 
Bill of Exceptions, but under ithe stipulation as it ap·pears. 
on Page 141, Mr. Mulliner was permitted to make oral 
objections to the p·roposed bill. Objection was made 
by Mr. J\fulliner that as a part of the cross-·examination 
of the witness Latimer he stated ithat he did not make 
claim to a right-of-way to Mr. Ball or to p[aintiffs or 
their p·redecessor in title, and suggestion was made that 
this testimony should be added to the transeript. 
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,At Page 142 of the transcript the exact testimony 
as claimed by Mr. Mulliner was stated hy him to he that 
the witness Latimer was asked ''whether it had been dis-
cussed and whether he was on friendly terms with the 
plaintiff and his predecessor in title,'' and the last 
statement he made· was to the effect that he had not 
claimed a right-of-way so far as plaintiff or his· pr~­
decessors in title wer·e concerned. At that page (142) 
of the trancript, Judge Van Cott says that in his best 
judgment and reco1lection Latimer made the statement 
"that he at no time made any claim to a right-of-way, the 
one in question.'' 
As will appear from the transcript, this trial took 
place November 28, 1947. This matter was p~resented 
to Judge Van Cott December 18, 1948, som·e thirteen 
months subsequent to the time the witness Latimer tes-
tified. Such :testimony does not appear any place in the 
notes of the trial prepared by Judge, VanCott, but there 
does appear in Judge Van Cott's notes, in his hand-
writing, and in the testimony of Latimer, the following 
words: ''Never discussed the right-of-way with anyone.'' 
It definitely appears at Page 90 of the transcript 
in the testimony of Latimer on cross-examination, and 
at the end of his examination, and in accordance with 
the notes of Judge Van Cott, that L·atimer never had 
any discussion with any of the owners of plaintiffs' 
p~roperty concerning the right-of-way. 
Mr. Rasmussen, the -court reporter, at r·age 142 of 
the transcript, states that 1the witness Latimer was not 
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a flighty 'Yitness but spoge slowly, and Mr. Rasmussen 
felt that he 'vas ab~e to report accurately all that fue 
'Yitness said. The certificate of Mr. Rasmussen at Page 
139 is to the effect that he caused the shor1thand notes 
of the testimony to be transeribed, and that the pages 
numbered from 1 to 138 consitute a full, true and corriect 
transcript of the shorthand notes taken at the trial of 
the action and a full, true and correct report of th~ 
evidence, testin1ony and other proceedings had and given 
in said cause on said dates. 
PE·TITION 
Comes now the defendant and appellant and pe~ti­
tions this Honorable Court to strike· from the Bill of 
Exce'ptions all of the testimony and proceeding app;ea.r-
ing in Pages 140 to i45 of the transcript, together with 
the attached notes of Judge Van Cott, and that this. 
Honorab1e Court settle as the Bill of Exceptions in this 
case the transcript of the evidence, consisting of Pages 1 
to 139, together with the exhrbits offered in the cas·e, 
together with the judgment roll. This petition is made 
upon the files and record in this matter now before 
the Su~preme Court, and for the reason that Judge Van 
Cott acted without and in excess of his jurisdiction in 
settling the Bill of Exceptions and adding purported 
testilnony contrary to and not supported by the notes of 
the reporter Clyde Rasmussen. ·This petition is made 
pursuant to ;Section 104-39-7, U.C.A., 1943. 
SPECIFICATIONS ·O·F ERROR 
1. 'The Court erred in considering as evidence in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
this case purported testimony of Richard C. Latimer, 
as indicated at Page 142 of the transcrip~t, for and upon 
the reason that notes of the reporter clearly indicate 
that no such evidence was ever introduced in the case, 
and that the Court acted in excess of its jurisdiction and 
authority in considering such evidence. 
2. 'The Court erred in the order settling the Bill of 
Exceptions, wherein the Court has attempted to add to 
the reported and transcribed notes of tile court reporter, 
purported testimony of Richard Latimer, and including 
in the record the Pages 140-14·5 of the transcript, as 
contrary to law and fact, and in excess of the jurisdiction 
of the Court. 
3~ ·The Cou:vt erred in its third Finding of Fact, in 
this, that it was found that plaintiffs are· now, and that 
they and their predecessors in interest have for many 
years been, the owners and entitled ~to the possession of 
al~ of the lands claimed by plaintiffs in their complaint, 
for. and upon the reason that said finding is contrary to 
law and to the evidence. 
4. :The Court erred in its fourth Finding of Fact, 
wherein it excluded from the finding, which shows tthe 
piroperty owned by the defendant, the right-of-way claim-
~d by defendant in defendant's 'Counterclaim, for the 
reason that the failure to include the right-of-way in 
this Fourth Finding is ·contrary ito law and to the evi-
dence. 
5. The Court erred in its sixth Finding of Fact 
in this: That it found defendant had not used the south-
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erly portion of plaintiff's property openly, notoriously 
and continuously under a claim of right or adversely ~to 
plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest for a pe-riod 
of t"\Yenty years immediately preceding the fi~ing of this 
action, or any twenty-year period th·ereof~ which finding 
is contrary to the law and the evidence. 
6. The Court erred in i~ts seventh Finding of Fact 
in this: That it found that the defendant had no right, 
title or interest to all or any part of the real estate under 
consideration belonging to ·the plaintiffs by way of ease-
ment or at all, which finding is contrary to the law and 
the evidence. 
7. The Court erred in its Conclusions of Law, and 
particularly the second Conclusion, for the reason that 
the same is contrary to the law and is contrary ~to the 
evidence. 
8. The ·Court erred in its. third Conclusion in that 
said Conclusion is contrary to law and is contrary to 
and not supported by the facts .. 
9. The Court erred in its judgment, and p 1articu-
larly Paragraph 2 thereof, in ·determining that the de-
fendant take nothing by reason of the countercl~im, 
for the reason that said judgment is· contrary to ·evidence 
in the case and is not suppor~ted by the Findings or Con-
clusions of the Court. 
10. The Court erred in entering its judgment, and 
particularly Paragraph 3 thereof, for the r'eason that 
said decree is contrary to law and is not supported by 
the evidence, findings or conclusions. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
11. The Court erred in entering its judgment, and 
particularly Paragraph 5 thereof, in that said judgment 
is not supported by the Findings of Fact or ,Conclusions 
and is contrary to the evidence and law of the case. 
12. The Court erred in entering its judgment, and 
particularly Paragraph 6 ~thereof, restraining defendant 
from the use of the right-of-way, for and upon the reason 
that said judgment is not supported by the evidence, 
Findings or Conclusions, and is contrary to law. 
13. !The Court erred in ·entering judgment for costs 
in the sum of $13.20 for the reason that the judgment 
for costs is not supported by the evidence and is contrary 
to law. 
14. The Court erred in refusing to grant the mo-
tion of ithe defendant for a new tria~, particularly upon 
the grounds specified in said motion to the ·effect that 
the judgment is contrary to the evidence and is against 
law. 
ARGUMEN'T 
The Specifications of Error have, heen group,ed un-
der the following headings and will be consolidated for 
the convenience of counsel and court in the headings as 
they appear in the argument. 
I. 
THE CO'URT ERRED IN ATTEM'PTING TO INSERT IN 
THE BILL OF EXCEPTIONS THE PURPORTED TESTI-
MONY O·F ONE OF THE WITNESSES CONTRARY TO THE 
TRANSCRIBED NOTES OF THE REPORTER. 
Under this heading we are submitting our argu-
ment in hehalf of the petition to strike from the Bill of 
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Exceptions the purported testimony of the witness Lati-
mer as to 'vhether he did or did not claim the right-of-
'Yay. '': e feel that in addition to our petition as a matter 
of law, Judge \Tan Cott committed error in making this 
a p·art of the Bill of Exception, for he has thereby in-
serted into the record purported testimony of ,the ·witness 
Latimer which 'vas never given, and ·evidently considered 
evidence in malting his decision which was never intro-
duced and 'vhich was never a part of this case. 
First and above aR, we want to state that w·e ea.n 
at no time determine as a mental process all of the 
inferences or determinations which Judge Van Cott in 
his mind attempted to make from such purported evi-
rence. He stated to us in testimony which does not 
appear in the notes at the time the Bill was being settled 
that he had in his own mind placed great emphasis in 
making his decision as to the right-of-way upon the fact 
that Latimer had nor claimed such a right-of-way. 
~Ir. Rasmussen's notes, at Page 90, which coincide 
with the notes kept by Judge Van Cott, are to the effect 
that Latimer never discussed the right-of-way with any 
person. The fact remains that the ~testimony and record 
in this ease shows that the property had originally come 
to the father of the witness Latimer. The reeo;rd further 
shows that for a period of forty years or m·ore, Latimer 
had only a one-eleventh interest in this property, and 
that he collected the rent and purchased the coal for 
furnishing heat to the premis·es. 
Assuming, therefore, for the purpose of argument, 
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that Latimer had never oraHy made a claim to the right-
of-way to any of the predecessors in interest of plaintiffs, 
the only emphasis that could· be placed upon this is 
that Latimer, an owner of one-eleventh interest, has 
never said anything to anyone about the right-of-way 
by way of claiming it. In other words, Latimer's pur-
por~ted testimony is that he had never discussed the right-
of-way with anyone. 
So, consistent with this must he the fact that he 
never made any statement of any kind about it, so that 
any testimony of Latimer, as aided or interpreted by 
Judge Van Cott, would be a reflection of a mental process 
of Latimer and not a vocal or physical one. If Judge 
Van Cott, ther·efore, was to give any emphasis and, as 
he said, base his judgment upon the mental process of 
a one-eleventh owner of the property, then we submit 
that ther·e is no more elear indication of the error that 
Judge VanCott fell into, because, as we wil1 show further 
on, there is no necessity or requirement that ~the party 
claiming this prescriptiv.e right must vocally proclaim 
his intentions to the other party or to the world, and 
that his use ·of the right~of-way, or the use of the right-
of-way by his tenants for a prescriptive period, is suf-
ficient to establish his right. Judge Van Cott has clearly 
d~sregarded that law if he gave any weight or emphasis 
(which he indicated he did) to this purported testimony 
of the witness Latimer. 
We cannot help put feel that this matter goes beyond 
this for a judge, thi~teen months after a 1trial, inserts as 
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purported evidence statements of a witness which do· 
not appear in the transcribed notes but which would also 
he contrary to the 'vho'le tenor of the wi~tness' testimony 
and to his actual statement as ap·pears her~ein. In this 
case there "\Vas no evidence introduced by the plaintiffs 
as to the use of this right-of-way, and the evidence of 
the defendant is clear and conclusive that the right-of-
"\VRY had been used for a period greatly in exeess of forty 
year, and for Judge VanCott to make his judgment, as 
he did, contrary to that evidence, it ap·pears to us he was 
attempting to find some fact which would sup,port his 
conclusion contrary to the evidence, as he appears to 
have selected what he thought the witness testified to, 
rather than the actual testimony of the witness, to 
destroy the effect of that evidence. 
In other words, Latimer and Gotberg shared the 
use of the right-of-way for over for'ty years, and the 
only way that Judge Van Cott eould have ignored all 
of that testimony, which was uncontroverted in every 
respect, was to attempt to find some flaw, which he 
attemp~t.ed to do in basing his decision upon the mental 
process of Latimer. Certainly, any purported mental 
process of this one-e;leventh owner, Richard Latimer, 
will not vary many times the opinion of this Court that 
an open' and continuous use for a period of twenty years 
established ~the ·p,rescriptive right, nor can it he effective 
to any other owner, or the other ten-elevenths interest 
in the property. 
The petition to strike from the hill and to have the 
Supreme Court set,tle the bill, as heretofore mentioned, 
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is made pursuant to 104-39-7. And, in this connection 
we desire to point out to the Court the fact that the 
clain1ed omission from the reported tes~timony of the 
question put to the witness, Latimer, and his reply is 
contrary to all of the evidence and to the contentions of 
Latimer. We desire in this connection to -call {.he Court's 
attention to the circumstance appearing at Page 9'1 of 
the transcript, and following, wherein Latimer detai~s a 
circumstance wher~e one of the tenants, a Mr. Moore, had 
been requested by the plaintiffs to change his practice 
of parking his car on this right of way. Mr. Mulliner, 
in his cross examination of Mr. Latimer, brought out the 
fact that the ~plaintiff had requested the witness, Moore, 
not to park back there. Mr. Latimer stwted that they 
wanted Moore to pay rent, and Moore kicked up a fuss. 
He stated that the plaintiffs bought Moore out and took 
over a lease of the property. At Page 92 of ~the record, 
Mr. Latimer details that l\{oore made a report to Latimer 
of this elaim of the plaintiffs' and Latimer, therefore, 
went down to talk to the plaintiffs about it. Using Mr. 
Latimer's words, he states that Moor;e said the plain-
·tiffs "were making a little trouble, I went down and 
saw them.'' This was in the year 1940, and at tha;t tin1e 
Latimer states that his response to the p~aintiffs was 
to take them out and show them that they were using 
'the west wall of his building as a joint wall. After he 
told the plaintiffs this· they didn't say anything mor-e 
about Moore's using the right of way. Latimer states 
that on this occasion nothing was said by anyone about 
the right-of-way. 
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This sho,vs that the immediate reaction of Latimer 
to plaintiffs' obj·ection of Moore parking his car in the 
right-of-,yay, "\Vas Latimer's assertion of the fact that 
they were relying upon an easement in the use of his 
party "\Vall, and if they \\'anted to raise any trouble he 
would also. ....ls soon as he asserted his rights the plain-
tiffs had nothing to say about the right of way, and 
his testimony is that at no time in all of his history and 
connection with the Latimer property had anyone ever 
discussed the use of the right-of-way with him, that it 
had a:lways been used for the convenience of th·e building. 
The ~Ioore incident demonstrated Latimer's reac-
tion to be that he felt they had a right in the right-of-
way, and he took a very definite stand in defens,e of that 
right, and asserted it in the very manner in which we 
would exp·ect of a fine old gentleman, such as he is. 
In other words, by his assertion of his rights he let them 
know that he was in a position to assert some claims, 
if they wanted to question his right, or that of his tenant, 
to use that right-of-way. 
It is noted that the defendant herein took exception 
to Judge Van Cott's settling the Bill of Exceptions with 
this additional testimony, (Tr. 144) and that Judge Van 
Cott, in disregard of this exception, settled the Bill of 
Exceptions. 
In the cas·e of Cent-er Creek Water amd Irriga.t!von 
Co. vs. Thomas, 19 Utah 360, 57 Pac. 30, at Page 362 
of the Utah Report the Supreme Court of this state said: 
''If, however there was anything omitted from 
the hill of exceptions, which the respondent re-
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garded as material, then his counsel ought to have 
· -objected on that ground, to the settling of the bill 
until the correction was made. Then if the judge, 
in disregard of the objection, had settled the 
bill, counsel should have taken an exception to 
the ruling, and thereupon instituted proceedings 
in this court, as provided in Sec. 3289, R. S., to 
have the bill corrected and settled in accordance 
vvith the facts. 
Since the defendant has taken exception and, pur-
suant to the statut·e, petitioned this Honorable Court to 
settle the Bill of Exce'ptions without that additiona~ tes-
imony, under the authority of this case defendant should 
have the Bill of Exceptions settled to include rthe tran-
script from Page 1 to Page 139, inclusive. 
We do not believe that this Honorable Court will 
penni t a District Court in settling a Bill of Exceptions 
to bring into the evidence of the case testimony that was 
never submitted and entered, and to base the judgment 
upon or give any weight to such purported testimony. 
If this Court wil1l permit the lower District Court to var.y 
the evidence as shown by the transcribed notes of the 
reporter, then there would be no sacredness in the right 
of appeal and no protection whatsoever to the parties 
litigant if the District Judge can open wide and. make 
his own record of the testimony, and thereby make judg-
ments on facts never presented and 'preclude the injur·ed 
party in his right of appeal. 
We feel that the institution of court reporters and 
their place in the lower court, and their accuracy in 
reporting testimony, is for a purpose, and was instituted 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
to prevent such a thing from occurring as has happened 
here. What does it avail us to have high1ly paid and 
trained individuals, able to properly take and transcribe 
testimony, if that testimony can be set aside by mere 
recollection, especially when that recollection is so con-
trary to the actual notes of the judge which he himself 
kept J? \Y .. e submit, therefore, in our Specifications of 
Error that Judge \Tan Cott, in failing to consider this 
testin1ony and in failing to grant our motion for a new 
trial, has committed error for which this Court should 
give us r·edress. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THE DEFENDANT TO HAVE 
ACQUIRED l\. PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT Q·VER. THE 
LANDS OF PLAINTIFFS AS DESCRIBED IN DEFEND-
ANT'S COUNTERCLAIM. 
The facts in this case show that since 1891 up, to 
the time of the trial the right-of-way as -claimed by de-
fendant had been continuously and uninterruptedly and 
adversely used by defendant and his predecessors in 
interest. The elementary proposition as to the creation 
of a prescriptive easem·ent is stated in the Restatement 
of the Law of Property, Vol. 5, Section 457, as follows: 
''An ·easement is created by such us·e of land, 
for the period ·of prescription, as '\vould be 1J1rivi-
leged if· an easement existed, p·rovided the use is 
(a) adverse, and (b) for the p·eriod of preserip-
tion, continuous and uninterrupted.'' 
The uncontroverted facts show that the owners of 
the building h~d for forty years rented the building, 
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and, under the terms of the rental, furnished the heat ; 
that in furnishing this heat, th~ coal to operate the 
furnace was brought to the heating p'lant on defendant's 
property over the right-of-way; that in addition, the 
tenants in the building us-ed the right-of-way in secur-
ing the delivery of merchandise, supplies, etc. This is 
clearly shown in the evidence. 
Mr. Latimer testified that this heating plant was 
put in in 1893 (Tr. 74), and that since its installation 
they, , the Latimer family, _have furnished the heat and 
ordered the coal for the building ever since ('Tr. 76). 
He was asked, "How was the coal brought into this 
property~" The reply by Mr. Latimer was, "Brought 
in by trucks through the alleyway on the south." (Tr. 76) 
Exhibits 3, 4, 5 and 6 are pictur:es of the right-of-way 
and clear'ly show this alleyway and its location in respect 
to the heating plant. O·bviously the only means of get-
ting the coal into the plant was by means of this right-
of-way. When asked to draw the course taken by the 
delivery trucks, 1\rfr. Latimer drew a red pencil mark, 
which is shown on Exhibit A and is referred to at Page 
82 of the transcript. 'This property remained in the 
Latimer family for over forty years and they made use 
of this right-of-way all of that time-all of which evi-
dence is without contradiction. Not only did Mr. Latimer 
testify to the use of the right-of-way for the deliveries 
of coal, but construction work was also carried on in 
the rear of his premises, ~d deliveries for the materials 
were made by means of this right-of-way (Tr. 80-85). 
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The ".,.itness Gotbe.rg testified that he actually saw 
the deliveries of coal by means of this right-of-way 
(Tr. 99-100). Not only were deliveries of eoal made 
by means of this right-of-way, but also deliveries of 
groceries and other merchandise were made by this 
means (Tr. 101-102). He was asked, "Would there he 
any merchandise, any groceries, any deliveries at that 
time go into that property~'' To which he replied, ''Yes, 
they had the back part of the building that had a kitchen, 
but you see, there wasn't on1y one lady - it changed 
hands three or four times, but one of them was th·ere 
for about 25 years, I guess.'' All of this testimony is 
uncontradicted in any manner whatsoever. Mr. G·ot-
berg further testified (Tr. 103) : 
'' Q. Did you ever see them make any deliveries 
of material for the repair of the roof~ 
A. To do that with 1 
Q. Yes. 
A. They had a tar wagon and al~ out on the 
south side of the building. 
Q. Would they bring the tar wagon in through 
this same right-of-way you have described~ 
A. Yes.'' 
On cross- examination, Mr. Gotherg was asked, 
''Have you seen a coal truck actually come in there, 
back into the boiler plant~" To which Mr. Gotberg 
rHplied, " Oh, yes, I seen that quite often, because after 
they had the garage built right in there, right there on 
that corner, they had such a hard time to get in the coal, 
so they sometimes had to carry it and sometimes had 
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to have an extremely long chute to shoot it down. If 
they could get the wagon close enough it was easy to 
get it into the hole, because the hole is in the cei'ling of it. 
The n1achine shop is built under the ground, under the 
top of the ground.'' 
The evidence ·shows that all of the use heretofore 
mentioned was made without asking the permission of 
any person; was made openly, notoriously and with a 
claim of right. No objection was ever made to the use 
of the right-of-way. 
On cross-examination Mr. Latimer was asked (Tr. 
90) : '''The question of your using this· right-of-way, 
using, you say, Mr. Latimer, and I believe you're right, 
in this, that the question of these people in this part 
using this entrance to get to the back of the premises 
has never been discussed by you at all, has it~ . To this 
Mr. Latimer replied : ''I never had any trouble with 
anybody ahout it..'' Then Mr. Mulliner asked, ''And it 
has never been even ta1ked of, has it~" The reply was, 
"No." 
At Page 91 of the transcript Mr. Mulliner asked 
Mr. Latimer: "Your relations with Mr. Sdrales and 
Mr. Latses have always been friendly and neighborly 
·while you have been there~'' To this Mr. Latimer re-
plied: "Yes, ~ir." Even in the one instance when one 
of Mr. Latimer's tenants was parking his car in this 
alleyway and the question arose over his right to so 
park, no objection was made by Mr. Sdrales or Mr. 
Latses over the use of this right-of-way (Tr. 93). 
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In the lTtah ease of Zollinger v. Fr,ank, 110 Utah ·514, 
175 Pac. (2d) 71±, at Page 715, in s'peaking of the char-
acter of use nere~~ary to initiate a prescrip·tive right, 
our court said : 
~"Regardless of the words used to character-
ize this elen1ent of the nature of the use necessary 
to give rise to a prescriptive easement, it is our 
opinion that the courts mean that the use must 
be against the owner as distinguished from under 
the owner.'' 
And again, at Page 716, our court· stated: 
"We think the better rule is that described 
as the prevailing rule in the above quotation. 
· That is, where a claimant has shown an open 
and continuous use of the land for the prescrip-
tive period (20 years in Utah) ~the us·e will be 
presumed to have been against the owner and 
the owner of the servient est~te to prevent the 
prescriptive easement from arising has the bur-
den of showing that the use was wnder him in-
stead of against him. This rule was mentioned in 
the recent case of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch 
Co. v. Moyle, Utah, 159 P. 2d 596, (on rehearing) 
174 P. 2d 148, 155, where it was said: 'It is true 
that to ·establish an easement the use must be 
notorious and continuous and on this adverse-
ness-that is, holding against the ·owner-will be 
presumed.' See also Northwest Cties Gas Co. 
v. Western Fuel Co., 13 Wash. 2d, 75, 123. P. 2d 
771; Eagle Rock Corporation. v. Idamont Hotel 
Co., 59 Idaho, 413, 85 P. 2d 242; Fleming v. How-
ard, 150 Cal. 28, 87 P. 908; Stetson v. Young-
·quist, 76 Mont. 600, 248 P. 196." 
One of the latest Utah cases on this point is that 
of D~ahnken v. George Romney & .Sons. C~o., ------ Utah ______ , 
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184 Pac. (2d) 211. It presents a fact situation almost 
identica1 with that of this case. That case involved 
downtown Salt Lake City business p-roperty on the west 
side of J\fain Street, which was serviced by an alleyway 
running north from ·Third 'South, and in that case the 
witnesses testified that the alleyway had been used from 
189~ to 1940 to haul in merchandise of all kinds and 
to take out trash; that this use was by the employees 
and lessees of the defendant in that case. Also in that 
case there had been no eontroversy at any time over the 
use of the alleyway until shortly prior to the filing of 
the suit. 
This court sustained the 1lower court's judgment that 
an easement by prescription had been acquir'ed by the 
defendant in that case under a fact situation identical 
\vith that in the case we are now presenting to the Court. 
In so holding the Court stated as follows : 
We held in Zollinger v. Frank, Utah, 175 P. 
2d 714, 716, that, 'where a claimant (to an ease-
ment) lias shown an open and continuous (and 
uninterrupted) use of the land for the pres-crip-
tive period (20 years in Utah) the use will be 
presumed to have been against the owner and 
the owner of the servient estate to prevent the 
~prescriptive easement from arising has the bur-
den of showing that the use was under hin1 in-
stead ·of ~against him.' 
'''There is no evidence in the record tending 
to rebut the presumption of adverse use hy the 
occupants of the defendants' premis-es. It was, 
therefore, not error for the lower court to adjudge 
the defendant Romney to be owner of an ease-
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ment over segments 'A' and 'B' and defendant 
Investment (~ompany the owner of an easement 
over segment 'B~' said ease1nents appurtenant to 
the defendants' lands.'' 
,,r e subn1it, therefore, that the presumption having 
arisen, it \Yas then the burden of the plaintiffs to show 
that the use \Yas uni!er him instead of ~against him. We 
submit that there is no such eYidence in this case. 
In \-rol. 28 of Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 736, the 
general rule is stated that : 
''proof of an open, notorious, continuous and 
uninterrupted user for the prescrip~tive period, 
without evidence to explain how it began, raises 
a presumption that it was adverse and under a 
·claim of right, or, as is sometimes stated, raises 
a presumptive of a grant, and casts on the owner 
of the servient tenement the burden of showing 
that the user was permissive or by virtue of 
some license, indulgence, or agreement, incon-
sistent with the right -claimed.'' 
This rpresumption to which we have referred has 
been held in ·a number of cases to he conclusive, a.s 
stated in Am. Jur., Vol. 17, at Page 970: 
''On the one hand, many courts favor the 
view that an adverse user of an easement for the 
required period creates a conclusive judicial p-re-
sumption of a prescriptive right by a lost grant, 
and that it is not a p·roper question to he sub-
mitted to the jury to determine whether this us-er 
gives a right.'' 
vVe submit that where there has been no evidence 
introduced to rebut the testimony p·resented by the de-
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fendant, as a matter of law the easement of the defend-
ant had been established, and as a matter of law a grant 
of right-of-way would be presumed. 
There c.an be no question that the use by the de-
fendant had been for the prescribed period for, as stated 
in 17 Am. J ur. at Page 973: 
' 'If an easement is claimed by prescription 
as appurtenant to other lands, it is not generally 
considered necessary for the owner of the doini-
nant tenement to show continued user by himse'lf 
for the prescriptive period; he may tack the user 
by his predecessors intitle, provided there is no 
interval het\veen the successive possessions dur-
ing which the user was not adverse. It has been 
held,. however, that if the right to the· use of a 
driveway across neighboring land has not been 
specifically conveyed by the successive o"rners of 
property, there can he no tacking the rights so 
as to build up any claim of right or title to an 
·easement by prescription. ·The tacking of periods 
of user in respect of leased p~remises is discussed 
in another article of this work.'' 
It is further submitted :that under the ZO'llvnger v. 
Frank and Dahnken v. R·omn.ey cases, supra, the open, 
continuous and uninterupted use of the right-of-way for 
the prescribed period presumes that the use is against 
the owner. 
We submit that the evidence in ~this case as trans-
cribe~ by the reporter is clearly to the effect that the 
use was o-pen, notorious and continuous for almost sixty 
years. At Page 142, Judge Van Cott says he has a 
recollection, or it is his best judgment, that Latimer 
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said he had made no claim to the right-of-way. What 
the record shows is that Latimer said he never t,alkerl 
\vith anyone about the right-of-\vay. Do \Ve try cases 
on the evidence introduced in a case or on the miscon-
ception by the Court of the ,evidence 1 Judge Van 
Cott cannot justify his decision on facts not in evidence. 
This is a most ambiguous statement in any event, 
as "\Ye cannot determine from the recollection of Judge 
\ ... an Cott whether he meant that Latimer had never 
claimed it to any person, or \Yhether Latim,er stated in 
court that he did not himself at any time believe he 
had an easement or right-of-way. We submit that this 
last is so entirely against the whole tenor of Latimer's 
testimony as to be wholly without support for the Judge's 
recollection. 
We have heretofore submitted the testimony show-
ing that from the circumstances surrounding the use of 
the right-of-way by Moore, Latimer very definitely 
asserted their right to the use of this easement. 
The case of z,ollifng.er v. Frank, supra, is well anno-
tated in 170 A.L.R., 7'76, and in that annotation is stated 
the general rule and numerous authorities are cited in 
support thereof. On Page 778 it says: 
"Under common-law principles, any' unauth-
orized entrance upon another's land is a tort, a 
trespass, th·e subject of action~ The right of its 
owner is that of exclusive possession; an inva-
sion of that possession is theoretica1ly as much a 
breaking of his 'close' as when the latter eon-
sisted of stockaded ground, and when the law re-
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quired any p·erson approaching the stockaded 
homestead to blow a horn loudly and thus give 
notice that he came openly and peaceably. 
''The breach of possession being thus a 
wrong, it. is presumed that 'no man would suffer 
another to enjoy an easement in his land if he 
could help it, an easement being a burden neces-
sarily detrimental to his estate.' Goddard, Ease-
ments, ·p. 134. And correlative'ly it is presumed 
that 'if one n1an does make such use of another's 
property without objection on the owner's part, 
it is because he had a right by some instrument 
or grant, which is lost or cannot be produced.' 
Shaw, Ch. J. in Carrig v. Dee (1860), 14 Gray 
(Mass.) 583. 
'~Implicit in this view of the relationship of 
the parties is the notion that a continuing breach 
of the owner's possession without his permission 
is adverse to his ownership. Every unauthorized 
trip over a way is necessarily adverse to the 
owner of the soil and under a claim of right. 
Foreman v. Greenburg (1921), 88 W. Va. 376, 
106 S. E. 876. . 
'' 'The better definitions do· not use the words 
'hostile right'-they say 'provided the use is ad-
verse'." Jacobs v. Brewster ( 1945), 3'54 Mo. 729, 
190 S. W. (2d) 894. 
''The resulting rule affirmed by a majority 
of American courts, though stated in varying 
forms, is as follows: Upon its appearing that a 
servitude has been enjoyed during the ·period re-
quired for prescription, openly, continuously and 
uninterruptedly, a presumption arises, in the ab-
sence of any other explanation, that the user was 
adverse and under a elaim of right. The burden 
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is then upon the owner of the soil to show that 
the use 'vas permissive, or other,vise that it was 
not adverse.'' 
It has been shown by the evidence and in this brief 
that there 'vas a eontinuous use of this easement in 
exress of forty years by the defendant and his predeceslO. 
sors in interest. It is not necessary for the defendant 
to be the sole user for the entire- p·eriod. As long as 
there is privity between the predecessors in interest of 
defendant, this use may be tacked on to the use of de-
fendant to gain the full prescriptive period. 
An annotation in 171 A.L.R. at Page 1279 states the 
rule as follows : 
'' ~tllthough there are a few cases to the -con-
trary, the overwhelming weight of authority sup·-
ports the view that the owner of a dominant 
estate need not show continued use hy himself 
for the prescriptive period to establish an ease-
ment, but may tack the user by his predecessors 
in title, where such successive owners are :privies 
in estate and their possessions -constitute one con-
tinuous possession.'' 
It is noted that the following Utah cases have applied 
this rule: 
Bertolina v. Frates (1936), 89 Utah 238, '57 P. 
2d 346 (rule applied) ; 
Malouf v. Fischer (1945), 108 Utah 35·5, 159 P. 
2d 881 (rule applied) ; 
Zollinger v. Frank (1946), 110 Utah 514, 175 P. 
2d 714, 170 A.L.R. 770 ( ru~e applied). 
At Page 1284 ·of 171 A.L.R. authority is cited to 
the effect that the use by a tenant can be tacked on to 
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the landlord's or subsequent owner's use to complete 
the ~period essential to establish an easement hy prescrip-
tion. 
. I~I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING COSTS TO PLAIN-
TIF'FS FOR THE REASO·N THAT NO COST BILL WAS 
EVER SERVED OR FILED WITH THE COURT IN THIS 
CASE. 
The Court in thise case granted costs to plaintiffs 
in the amount of $13..20, which costs are not supported 
by the evidence. Costs are a matter of statute, and the 
statute of Utah requires that the person who claims his 
costs mu.st deliver to the clerk and serve a copy of ·the 
cost bill upon the adverse party within five days after 
the verdict or notice of the decision of the Court. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sec. 104-44-14. 
Since the plaint~ffs have failed to file a cost bill in 
this case within the prescribed time, or failed to file one 
at all, plaintiffs cannot recover costs. 
A decision by the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of Op!enshaw· v. O:p,ensha~, 80 Utah 9, 12. Pac. (2d) 3'64, 
at Page 365 states: 
''The right to costs is purely a sta;tutory 
right. A litigant -claiming his costs and to whom 
the trial court has awarded costs, in order to 
recover the same from the adverse party, must 
file his cost bill within the time prescribed by the 
statute. H·oughton et al v. Barton, 49 Utah ~611, 
165 P. 471; Checketts v. Collings (Utah), 1 P. 
(2d) 950, 75 A.L:.R. 1393. ·This the plaintiff did 
not do. ·Since the cost bill was not filed in time, 
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the inclusion in the judgment of the amount 
claimed in the bill renders the judgment to tha~ 
extent contrary to law·. It should be amended 
by striking out the costs.'' 
CONCLUSION 
'':e therefore respectfully submit that· the Court 
erred in granting costs in the decree, and that plaintiffs 
are not entitled to recover any costs 'vhatsoever in this 
ease. 
In conclusion it is respectfully submitted that this 
Court should strike from the Bill of Exceptions, Pages 
1±0 to 1±5 of the transcript, and that Judge Van Cott 
erred in considering and basing his judgment upon 
supposed evidence, and which testimony was never intro-
duced in the trial of the case. 
We further submit that the trial court erred as a 
matter of law and contrary to the evidence in failing 
to find that the defendant used the right-of-way openly 
and notoriously and adversely for the prescriptive 
period, and had acquired a right-of-way by p-rescription 
as claimed in his counterclaim. 'The defendant clearly 
showed that he had an open, continuous and notorious 
use of their right-of-way for a period in excess of forty 
years, and that such us-e gives him a p1resump,tion of 
adverse use necessary to establish a prescriptive ease-
ment .. This presumption was never rebutted by the 
plaintiffs, nor did they ever show that the use was per-
missive. The Court erred, and the judgment should be 
set aside wherein title is quited in p1laintiff and de-
fendant enjoined from using the right-of-way. 
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It is also respectfully submitted that the trial court 
erred in granting costs to the plaintiffs, since they failed 
to cornply with the statute in furnishing a cost bill in 
time, or for that matter at all. 
We, therefore, respectfully urge this Court to hold 
as a matter of law that the defendant had acquired a 
prescriptive easement over the portion of the plaintiffs' 
:premises claimed in defendant's counterclaim, and that 
this Court should declare as void that portion of the 
judgment granting costs to the plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, NIEL,SEN 
AND RICHARDS, 
C~ounsel fo.r Appellant. 
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